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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
FRED MATTER!, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
I ( 
) 
Case No. 
7413 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was tried before a jury in the Third District 
Court on a charge of murder. From a verdict and judgment of 
guilty of murder in the first degree, and sentence thereon, he has 
appealed. 
Plaintiff agrees, generally, with the statement of facts as 
incorporated in the brief of appellant. But inasmuch as the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict has been ques-
tioned, and such sufficiency has thus become a point of law, it 
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will be necessary to include in the argument a portion of the 
evidence produced by the state. 
POINTS 
1. The evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of 
guilty of murder in the first degree. 
2. In instructing the jury concerning the degrees of mur-
der, and reasonable doubt as to degree, the court was not requir-
ed to use the exact language of 105-32-5 Utah Code Annotated 
1943. 
3. It is not prejudicial error for a court to inform the jury 
of the steps the court may take in deciding whether to follow a 
mercy recommendation. 
4. There is nothing in the record to show that the court 
abused its discretion in refusing to follow the mercy recom-
mendation of the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
VERDICT OF GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE. 
There is no quarrel with defendant's cited cases insofar as 
they are used to indicate the elements of .first and second de-
gree murder. Nor can we take issue with the statement that first 
degree murder requires a showing-except in specified instances 
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--that the defendant killed the deceased with malice afore-
thought, deliberation and premeditation. State v.' Russell, 106 
Utah 116, 145 P. 2d 1003; State v. Trujillo (Utah) No. 7269. 
_- _ Murder is defined, and its. elements set out, by statute in 
Utah. The statutory provisions are found in 103-28-1, 2 and 
3 Utah Code Annotated 1943: 
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being 
with malice aforethought.'' ( 103-28-1) . 
"Such malice may be express or implied. It is ex-
press when there is manifested a deliberate intention 
unlawfully to take the life of a fellow creature. It is 
implied when no considerable provocation appears, or 
when the circumstances attending the killing show an 
abandoned and malignant heart." (103-28-2) 
"Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait 
or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious and 
premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration 
of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary 
or robbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated design 
unlawfully to effect the death of any human heing other 
than the one who is killed; or perpetrated by any act 
greatly dangerous to the lives of others and evidencing 
a depraved mind, regardless of human life;-is murder 
in the first degree. Any other homicide committed 
under such circumstances as would have constituted 
murder at common law is murder in the second degree." 
( 103-28-3) 
These sections have , been analyzed by this . court in the 
two cases cited above (State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P. 
2d 1003; State v. Trujillo (Utah) No. 7269] 
In the court below the case was submitted to the· jury on 
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the theory that the evidence might show a "willful, deliberate, 
malicious and premeditated killing" only. There was no instruc-
tion concerning poison, or killing while committing one of the 
designated felonies. There is no pretense that the defendant was 
attempting to kill any person other than Delk, or that he was 
behaving in a depraved manner toward a group of persons. 
As far as the sufficiency of the evidence is concerned, then, the 
question is resolved into one of whether there is enough evi-
dence to support a verdict that the defendant willfully, deliber-
ately, maliciously and premedit~tedly killed Levi P. Delk. The 
defense contends that the evidence indicates "no acts of prep-
aration, no securing of weapons, no lying in wait," "no bo~.sts, 
no threats, no arguments, nor other difficulties between the 
accused and Delk." 
It is admitted that if any of the elements above listed had 
appeared the state's case would have been strengthened. But 
that argument goes to what evidence might have been used, 
if available, to convict the defendant. Our problem is con-
cerned with the sufficiency of the evidence actually presented. 
The record of the proceedings discloses the following evi-
dence and testimony of facts and circumstances upon which the 
jury could rely in reaching its verdict: 
When the deceased was found, he had been brutally beat-
en. There were several injuries on the body, the most severe of 
which was located on the left side of the rear part of the head. 
At that point there was an "irregular laceration of the scalp 
from the top of the head down below the left ear" -about 7 
6 
3tU 
::)J 
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inches in length. The posterior part of the left side of the skull 
was broken in several places. On the front of the skull there was 
a laceration three quarters of an inch long which extended 
inward to the bone. The throat was punctured, apparently with 
a sharp instrument and after the death of deceased. Abra:iiCJns 
and contusions were found on various parts of the bo·dy. On 
the right side of the forehead there was a bruise of two inches 
diameter. Also on the forehead were three abrasions, "two 
which measured one inch in diameter each and a third which 
was one and a half inches long and about one-eigh~h inch in 
width." There was another abrasion on the nose. On the right 
knee there was one large abrasion and eight linear abrasions 
which were one-half to one inch long. An abrasion was found 
on the anterior part of the left leg, surrounded by an area of 
hemorrhage in the tissues. (R. 86-89) . 
An expert testified that the death of Delk resulted from 
the injury on the back of the head, that is, the seven-inch lacer-
ation and skull fracture (R. 90). This was caused by a blow with 
a "blunt object, possibly with a sharp or jagged edge." The 
blow must have been struck with great force (R. 90), and the 
injury was such that it would have necessarily been fatal (R. 
91). The force of the blow was so great that it could not have 
resulted from a fall to the ground after a blow to the chin. To 
cause such an injury by falling, the fall would have to· h::~ve 
been from a great height (R. 97, 98). It was improbable that 
a blunt instrument made the laceration on the forehead 
(R. 98). 
The body of deceased was found by two small boys on 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
May 6 while they were playing along Little Cottonwood 
creek (R. 110). The body was in the creek, and about half under 
water (R. ·115), but death did not result from drowning 
(R. 90). 
From the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, 
the nature and number of the wounds, the location of the body 
outside of any populous area, and the apparent placing of the 
body in a creek, the jury might at this point fairly conclude that 
the death of Delk was caused by a criminal agency, and that the 
agency responsible (whoever it was) had premiditatedly, ma-
liciously, and deliberately perpetrated the killing. It is not con-
tended that there was anything in the record to show or 
tend to show mitigation, provocation, or justification for the 
killing. 
·~: 
~d 
In addition to the facts and circumstances which im- :,)· 
mediately surrounded the killing, there is additional evidence 2:1 
which points toward premeditation and toward the defend-
ant. 
. : ~ 
It could be concluded that the defendant was either ac- :1.] 
quainted with Delk, or that he was familiar with his habits. The 
two lived at the. same tourist court and trailer camp at 3115 
Siluth State Street in Salt Lake County (R. 136, 137, 138). The ~t] 
deceased was regular in his habits, usually leaving the court :::t[ 
about 9 or 10 in the morning and returning about 5 or 6 p.m. :lt 
. 139 . (R ) :lr] 
't~rt 
Next to the apartment of defendant was an unfinished :~J 1 
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.. apartment. After the discovery _of Delk' s. bndy investigators 
found on the floor of this vacant unit indications of blood and 
vomit ( R. 260). The deceased· s blood was type "A" in the 
International Blood Grouping system (R. 317). On the floor 
of the unfinished apartment were found a paint stick and some 
paper stained with blood of type "A" (R. 320~ 321). There 
was evidence of blood on the floor, but it was· present in such 
small quantities that it did not admit of typing. An expert 
testified that vomiting often accompanies a fracture of the 
skull (R. 358, 359). 
From the automobile of Levi P. Delk the-state took some 
pieces of rubber matting (R. 340) which appeared to be stained 
with blood. These stains "tested positive" for the possible pres-
ence of blood (R. 319). On the panel of the left door of the 
truck were similar stains, which also "tested positive" (R. 341, 
267, 323). The truck had been washed on the inside prior to 
the time it was examined by investigating officers (R. 267). 
It was brought out that the key possessed by defendant 
for his apartment fitted, also, the unfinished unit, next to his, 
in which the stains were found (R. 142) . 
The tourist court operators last saw deceased alive on the 
evening of April 29 (R. 140). On the morning of April 30, 
defendant, in the presence of a notary public, signed the name 
of Levi P. Delk to a title certificate of Delk' s truck and stated 
that he was Delk (R. 167). Later the same day the defendant 
represented himself to be Delk and sold the Willys panel truck 
to a dealer (R. 207-212). Defendant was unsuccessful in his 
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attempt to sell a watch which had belonged to deceased (R. 
23 7), so he then pawned the watch in his own name (R. 246). 
When his landlady visited him on the morning of May 3, de-
fendant was upset (R. 183). 
The record contains evidence that while defendant was 
awating trial he began preparations for an escape from the 
Salt Lake County jail in which he was confined (R. 345-358). 
The above is a summary of the bulk of the state's evidence 
on which conviction was based. The record does, however, 
disclose certain other facts and circumstances which might have 
been considered by the jury. We rely upon the following cases 
and propositions of law to show that the jury was justified in 
finding that defendant coldly, premeditatedly, maliciously, and 
deliberately, murdered Levi P. Delk. 
The defense has argued at some length on the difference 
between express and implied malice, and the degree of murder 
which must be found where one or the other is shown. And 
while we feel that our statute sufficiently defines the elements 
of each degree so that these common law distinctions are sup-
erseded, we would like to point out that express malice was 
shown in this case. 
The difference between express malice and implied malice 
is of necessity a difference in the degree of malice shown, and 
not a diffrence in the type of evidence upon which the proof 
is based. In 1 Wharton's Criminal Law (11th Ed.), Sec. 145, 
we find the following statement: 
"The older English text-books distinguish between 
'malice express' and 'malice implied.' This, however, as 
10 
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is elsewhere shown, cannot be sustained. Our only way 
of proving malice is by inferring it from circumstance$. 
Even should a party, when examined on the stand, say, 
'I did the act maliciously,' the question would still re-
main, how far the statement is to be believed. The mode 
of proof is not demonstration, but inference." 
Our statute in effect adopts this view. Express malice is 
that malice in which there is manifested a deliberate intention 
unlawfully to take the life of a fellow creature. But, still under 
the statute, the lew· will imply malice where there is shown an 
unlawful killing and no considerable provocation appears; or 
where the circumstances surrounding the killing show an aban-
doned and malignant heart. There is nothing in the statute to 
indicate that express malice must be manifested by words or 
statements, or acts of preparation. 
We feel that this should answer the technical nicety of 
distinction between types of malice. \Vith this gone, the at-
tack on the sufficiency of the evidence must be based upon the 
idea that there was simply not that quantum of evidence which 
is necessary to sustain the verdict. It is well settled that a con-
viction for first degree murder can be had on circumstantial 
evidence alone. 
People v. Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 295 Pac. 333, 71 A. L. R. 
1385, supports the contention of the defendant that where 
ma~ice is "implied" it is second degree murder. But an exam-
ination of the cases cited in the Howard opinion shows that 
express malice may be inferred. One of the cases cited therein 
is People v. Bellon, 180 Cal. 706, 182 Pac. 420. It is used to 
support the statement that "if the act is preceded by, and be 
u 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the result of, a concurrence of will, deliberation and intent, 
the crime of first degree murder is proved." 
In People v. Bellon· the defendant had pleaded guilty to 
a charge of murder. California law required the court to de-
termine the degree. It was shown that the defendant had com-
mitted a violent assault upon his wife; and when the deceased, 
his mother-in-law, attempted to interfere, defendant slashed 
her throat with a razor. The California Supreme Court, in 
answer to the contention that the elements of first degree mur-
der were not shown, said: 
"It is difficult to attribute any other design than that 
of killing to one who knowingly strikes at the throat of 
another with a sharp razor with such force and strength 
as to cause death." 
Another California case concerned with the sufficiency 
of circumstantial evidence is People v. Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333, 
202 Pac. 51 (hearing denied by Supreme Court November 
25, 1921). There the body of deceased was discovered some four 
months after the killing. Defendant had been a tenant in a 
house owned by deceased, and in which the body was found. A 
physician testified that the deceased was probably killed by 
a bullet wound, though it was possible that death was caused 
by strangulation. Defendant was a small woman and deceased 
a 200-pound man. After discovery of the body it was learned 
that defendant had sold some jewelry of the deceased. After the ::] 
defendant had sublet the house to another, a pistol was found 
in one of the closets. Defendant had made some inconsistent 1~1 
statements to police officers. There was no direct evidence of ~] 1 
12 
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malice, p,reme<litation, or deliberation. Yet the California Court 
of Appeal (and the Supreme Court) upheld a conviction of 
murder in the first degree. Said the Court of Appeal: 
;,It i~ the general, if not universal, rule tha.t. where, 
a~ here, the evidence is entirely circumstantial, and no 
~ claim of any mitigating circumstances, justification, or 
excuse for the killing is advanced by the accused, the 
jury, from the nature of the wound inflicted, from the 
character of the weapon which the nature of the wound 
indicates was used, from the acts and conduct of the 
accused, and all the attendant and surrounding facts may 
infer that the deceased was unlawfully killed by the 
accused, with malice aforethought, as a result of a de-
liberate and premeditated purpose to kill, and so in-
ferring, the jury under such circumstances, may be war-
ranted in returning a verdict of murder in the first de-
gree. If a different rule prevailed, then, as· was said in 
People v. Mahatch, 148 Cal. 203, 82 Pac. 779, 'secret 
murders could rarely be punished by the infliction of 
the highest penalty.' * * * 
See State v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 447. The question 
of the degree of the crime is exclusively for the JUry, 
and their determination will not be disturbed when 
there is any evidence to support it. People v. Machuca, 
158 Cal. 64, 109 Pac. 886. We think that the circum-
stances disclosed by the evidence are ample to support 
the inference that the killing was unlawful, was done 
with malice aforethought. and was willful, deliberate 
and premeditated. * * *" 
People v. Mahatch, 148 Cal. 203, 82 Pac. 779, cited in the 
opinion, supra, was another case of an unwitnessed killing. 
The killer and the killed had apparently been friends priorto 
the homicide. In upholding the first degree murder verdict, the 
California Supreme Court said: 
13 
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, :, "The jury, having found that the only extenuating 
circurnstan.ces which he interposed had no existence in 
fact, and no ,claim of .any cin;um.stances .of mitigation, 
. justificatioQ o.t; excuse for the .. killing being advanced, 
had a right to .infer from the character of the weapon 
used, the nature of the wound inflict~, and the acts 
and conduct of the accused, the existence of a deliber-
ate. purpo,se on his . p~tt to kill. the, deceased when the 
fatal blow was struck, and, so inferring, were warrant-
ed in returning a verdi<::t. therefrom for murder in the 
first degree. This is the general, it may be said the 
univer~al, rule. * * *" 
In People v .. Davis, 8 Utah 412, 32 Pac. 670, the Utah 
Supreme Court held sufficient a pleading which omitted the 
allegation that there was an intent to kill. It was said there 
that the intent could be inferred from the facts pleaded, and 
that it was difficult to comprehend, from the instrument used, 
the fierceness of the assault, the manner and place of inflicting 
the wourids, and the instantly fatal result, that the defendant 
intended to commit any crime except first degree murder. 
In People v. Halliday, 5 Utah 467, 17 Pac. 118, the court 
was called upon to consider the elements of murder in the first 
degree. The opinion adopted the language of the Pennsylvania 
case of Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. St. 55, as follows: 
"What the definition [of malice] requires, there-
fore, is a distinctly formed intent to kill, not ·in self 
defense, and without adequate provocation. It requires 
the malice prepense or aforethought of the common 
·.law· definition of murder to be, not a general malice, 
· but a special maliCe that aims at the life of a person. 
·This distinctly formed intent to take life is easily dis-
tinguished, in the general from the instinctiveand spon-
14 
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- tanoeus reaction of mind and body against insult and 
injury, which is often the result of no distinctly formed 
intention; and also from those cases of previous and 
deliberate intention to kill, which may override even 
what without it· would be adquate provocation given 
at the time of the killing. 
Keeping this common understanding of the defi-
nition in mind, we shall also get clear of the influence 
of the cases in other states, where the terms deliberate 
and premeditated are applied to the malice or intent, and 
not to the act, and thus seem to require a purpose 
brooded over, and matured before the occasion at which 
it is carried into act. Under such a definition of the inten-
tion, all our jurisprudence by v.rhich malice and intent a !"e 
implied from the character of the act, and from the dead-
ly nature of the weapon used, would be set aside; for 
we could not from these imply such a previous and de-
liberate but only a distinctly formed intent, and this 
involves deliberation and premeditation,· though they 
may be very brief. We should therefore blot out all 9ur 
law relative to implied intent or malice, and .require it 
to be always proved as express. And this would be a 
most disastrous result; for the most deliberate mur-
derers are usually those who know how to conceal their 
intent until the occasion arises for the execution of it." 
The Supreme Court of Oregon has held that circumstantia] 
evidence is sufficient to establish all of the elements of murder 
in the first degree. In State v. Butcheck, ·121 Or. 141, 254 Pac. 
805, denymg a rehearing of 121, Or~ 141, ,253 Pac. 367, that 
court said: 
"The indict!llent in this. case alleges a specific pur-
. pose to kill. However, in.order to constitute murder in 
the first degree, the.re must be deliberation and premedi-
. taJ~on. But like:. every other material fact. arising on the 
15 
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trial, the formed design to kill may be est~blished by 
, circumstantial evidence which satisfies the mmds of the 
jurors, . beyond a. reasonable doubt, of the existen~e of 
a previous purpose to kill. Here the law wisely calls 
to its aid, in the administration of justice, ·presumptive 
evidence. The trial begins with the· pres1,1mption _of the 
defenda(lt's innocence. But, upon the proof of the 
commission of an unlawful act, the presumption is that 
such act 'was done with an unlawful intent' and that 
the perpetrator intends the unlawful consequence of 
his voluntary act.' Or. L. Sec. 799, subds. 1, 2, 3, * * * 
The existence of deliberate and premeditated mal-
ice in the killer's mind is the result of a mental con-
dition and is not subject to direct proof. For this rea-
son its existence may be inferred from tangible facts 
in evidence. 2 Bishops Criminal Law, p. 511; Under-
hill on Criminal Evidence (3rd Ed.) p. 709. As support-
ing this doctrine, see Wharton on Homicide, Sec. 150, 
2 Bishop's Crim. Law, Sec. 673, Cyclopedia of Criminal 
Law, Brill, 1076, and 30 C. J. 142, 143, where it is held 
that deliberation and premeditation may be inferred, as 
a matter of fact, from the circumstances, act, conduct, 
language, the character of the weapon used, and the 
nature and number of wounds inflicted.'' 
· The doctrines announced in the above cases have re-
ceived wide support. See People v. Erno, 195 Cal. 272, 232 
Pac. 710; State v. Hansen, 25 Or. 391, 35 Pac. 976; Hughes 
v. State, 29 Tex. Cr. App. 565, 16 S. W. 548; 3 Warren on 
Homicide 401. 
Tlie evidence also tended to show ( 1) Delk was taken 
to a remote spot and there killed, or ( 2) Delk was killed in the 
vacant unit adjacent. to defendant's apartment, and then the 
body was taken to a remote spot. Concealment of a body is a 
circumstanc~ which may be considered in determining the guilt 
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or innocence of an accused. See Hedger v. State ( 1911), 144 
Wis. 279, 128 N. W. 80, where the accused had been in and 
about the house in which his wife's body was later found. His 
failure to give an alarm, or disclose the fact of death, was held 
to be a circumstance justifying an inference of guilt. See, also, 
a note in 2 A. L. R. 1227. The jury might conclude that who-
ever killed Delk did it with malice aforethought and premedi-
tation and then concealed the body, or that the killer thought 
out the act and premeditatedly took Delk to a remote spot and 
killed him there. 
The evidence that defendant was in possession of de-
ceased's truck and watch serves a purpose at least twofold 
in nature. It ties the defendant to the crime, and it gives some 
added information as to the probability of premeditation. 
In 2 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 276, we find the following 
statement: 
"Whenever goods have been taken as a part of the 
criminal act, the fact of subsequent possession is some 
indication that the possessor was the taker, and there-
fore the doer of the whole crime. Thus such possession 
is receivable to prove other acts than the simple crime of 
larceny. It is receivable to show the commission of a 
burglary, a counterfeiting, a murder, a liquor .relltng, 
or any other crime in which either a chief or a subordi-
nate result might be the possession of a material ar-
ticle." (Author's emphasis) . 
In Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 40 L. Ed. 1090, 
16 S. Ct. 895, decided before there was any difference in de-
grees of murder, deceased was found in a decomposed condi-
17 
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tion ·about two weeks after he was last seen alive. Defendant 
was arrested on the same day the body was discovered. In his 
possess~on were five horses, a ~olt, wagon, gun, and bedclothing 
and other property which had belonged .to the dead man. The 
defendant was convicted of murder. The United States Su-
preme Court said: 
"Possession of the fruits of a crime recently after 
its commission justifies the inference that the possession 
is guilty possession, and, though only prima facie evi-
dence of guilt, may be of controlling weight unless ex-
plained by circumstances or accounted for in some way 
consistent with innocence. 1 Greenl. Ev. (15th Ed.) 
Sec. 34. * * * Proof that defendant had in his posses-
sion, . soon after, articles apparently taken from the de-
ceased at the time of his death is always admissible, 
and the fact, with its legitimate inference, is to be con-
sidered by the jury with the other facts in the case in 
arriving at their verdict.'' 
And see 4 Warren on Homicide 173: 
"Where money or other property of the deceased 
was found in the possession of the defendant it is evi-
dence of premeditated and deliberate killing." 
The Oregon case of State v. Barnes, 47 Or. 592, 85 Pac. 
998, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 181, contains a good discussion of the 
significance of possession of stolen property. See opinion and 
cases cited atpp. 1001 and 1002 of the Pacific Reporter; Little 
v. S~q~e, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 654, 47 S. W. 984. 
A~ :ras pointe.d out, supra, the evidence below also tended 
tp prove ~hat. defendant, while in the county jail, prepared to 
make an escape. See 2 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 276: 
18 
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"It is today universally recognized that the fact of 
an accused's flight, escape from custody, resistance to 
arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and 
related conduct, are admissible as evidence of conscious-
ness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself." 
And see the numerous cases cited and discussed in that section. 
The following authorities may also be found helpful: State 
v. Barnes, cited supra, 47 Or. 592, 85 Pac. 998, 7 L. R. A. 
(N.S.) 181; State v. Morgan, 22 Utah 162, 61 Pac. 527; People 
v. Flannelly, 128 Cal. 83, 60 Pac. 670. 
From the record, and the authorities cited and quoted, 
we see that the jury was justified in concluding that defendant 
had murd~red deceased in cold blood, with malice aforethought, 
premeditation and deliberation. The evidence was such that 
the jury could fairly find that defendant wanted property in 
the possession of Delk, that he thereupon decided to kill Delk, 
killed him in pursuance of his plan, and took his property. 
We have confined the above discussion to first degree 
murder. If the authorities cited are correct, a fortiori second 
degree murder may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The 
only difference would be that the circumstances would not have 
to establish deliberation and premeditation. 
POINT II 
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY CONCERNING THE · 
DEGREES OF MURDER, AND REASONABLE DOUBT AS 
TO DEGREE, THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
USE THE EXACT LANGUAGE OF 105-32-5 UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1943. 
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'In instructing the jury as to what it should do in the event 
there was reasonable doubt as to the degree of murder of which 
defendant was guilty, the court said: 
"You are further instructed that if you believe from 
all of the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed either the offense specifically 
charged in the information or one of the included of-
fenses, but if you have a reasonable doubt as to which 
of two or more offenses he did commit, then you can 
convict him only of the lowest degree as to those be-
tween or among which lies your doubt." (R. 36). 
Defendant had requested this instruction: 
"If you find from the evidence that the Defendant 
has committed a public offense and there is reasonable 
ground of doubt in which of two or more degrees he 
is guilty, under the law of this state you must find him 
guilty of the lowest of such degrees only." (R. 31). 
It is defendant's contention that the court's use of the 
word "can" instead of the word "must" was prejudicial error 
against the rights of defendant. An instruction similar to the 
one in question now was given by the trial court in State v. 
Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 207 Pac. 507. Said the court: 
"It is somewhat vigorously contended that the court 
erred in using the word 'can' instead of the term 'must', 
, which latter term is used in the statute. A mere cursory 
readi!lg of the instruction excepted to will disclose that, 
if the district court had used the term 'must' counsel ~rl 
in altlh;prdp~abilfifty wdo~ld bde hher~ complaf~md·nghthat th
1
e :~ 
cour a m e ect 1recte t e Jury to m t e appe-
lant guilty of some degree, and in such event there would u(l 
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at least be some reason for the contention. By using 
the term 'must' in the instruction referred to a very 
awkward expression would have resulted which might 
have been construed to mean that the jury was required 
to find the appellant guilty of some lower degree. The 
instruction as it stands, in our judgment, clearly reflects 
the true intent and purpose of the statute, and any juror 
with sufficient intelligence to sit in any case would not 
have been misled by what the court said." 
The instruction requested by the defendant here might 
have been construed by the jury as mandatory that they return 
a verdict of guilty of some degree of murder, for manslaughter 
is a public offense but is not, strictly, a degree of murder. We 
will concede, however, that the insertion of "must" in the in-
struction actually given by the court would not have been ob-
jectionable. But the essence of the statute is that the jury is 
required to find the lower degree, as between the higher and the 
lower, when there is reasonable doubt as to degree. The instruc-
tion as given modifies the word "can" with the word "only." The 
instruction as a whole leaves the jury no alternative but to 
choose the lower grade offense in case of doubt. When "can" 
is thus modified with "only" it can only be read as synonymous 
with "must." 
POINT III 
IT IS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR A COURT TO 
INFORM THE JURY OF THE STEPS THE COURT MAY 
TAKE IN DECIDING WHETHER TO FOLLOW A MERCY 
RECOMMENDATION. 
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Another objection taken to the court's instructions is that 
the defendant was prejudiced when the jury was given an ex-
planation of the effect of a recommendation of mercy. This 
supplemental instruction was given after the court had re-
called the jury to learn of its progress. The foreman asked for 
additional information. This request, and the court's answer, 
will be found on page 392 of the record and page 27 of the 
appellaht's brief. 
The defendant contends that this statement by the court 
was of such a nature that the jury could have been influenced 
to bring in a verdict of first degree murder, with a recommenda-
tion of mercy, rather than a second degree verdict which they 
would likely have returned in the absence of the court's state-
ment. 
We have been unable to find any authority which is direct-
ly in point with the question raised. State v. Kiefer, 16 S.D. 180, 
91 N .W. 1117, 1 Ann. Cas. 268, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 619, was 
concerned with an instruction wherein the judge intimated to 
the jury that he would follow a recommendation of mercy, and 
in that case there was prejudicial error. 
The problem here is somewhat different. The court did 
not give the jury any indication of what it would do with a 
recommendation of mercy but did, in fact, go to great lengths 
to avoid answering the jury's question as to how the court 
would "look at it." All the jury learned was the procedure the 
court was allowed to follow under the law. 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As provided by 105-33-3, a court may instruct the jury 
on a point of law after it has retired for deliberation, "if they 
desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause," 
so long as this instruction is given in the presence of the de-
fendant or his counsel. 
It is our belief that the court, in giving the challenged 
instruction, did nothing more than tell the jury, in the language 
of the layman, the legal effect of a recommendation of mercy, 
and the steps a court was allowed to take in determining the 
punishment. The law is contained in the statutes. 105-36-12 
Utah Code Annotated 1943 provides: 
"When discretion is conferred upon the court as 
to the extent of punishment, the court, at the time of 
pronouncing judgment, may take into consideration any 
circumstances, either in aggravation or mitigation of the 
punishment, which may then be presented to it by either 
party." 
And 105-36-13: 
"The circumtsances must be presented by the testi-
mony of witnesses examined in open court, except that 
when a witness is so ill or infirm as to be unable to 
attend, his deposition may be taken by a magistrate of 
the county, out of court, upon such notice to the ad-
verse party as the court may direct. No affidavit or 
testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or 
written, shall be offered to or received by the court or 
a judge thereof in aggravation or mitigation of the 
punishment, except as provided in this section." 
These sections do not confine to "legal evidence" the 
testimony which may be received in mitigation or aggravation. 
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Our jurisprudence does not require that a jury be kept 
ignorant of the law and the possible consequences of· a par-
ticular verdict. · The main requirement in cases of this type 
is that the court do nothing which will mislead the jury to 
the prejudice of the defendant. Here neither has the jury been 
misled nor the defendant prejudiced. We cannot see how 
12 jurors could have taken the above statement of the court 
and used it as a basis for returning a recommendation of mercy 
in lieu of a verdict of murder in the second degree. There 
was not a hint that the recommendation would be followed. 
When the court had finished explaining, the jury had no foun-
dation on which to conclude that defendant would not be 
executed for first degree murder. 
There is no use speculating on what the jury might have 
done without the explanation. The record indicates that the 
jurors were concerned with what effect the recommendation 
would have. It appears that they had reached a verdict if 
the recommendation of mercy meant what they thought it 
meant. After the explanation, the following conversation 
took place: 
"MR. CHRISTENSEN: I believe that is what we had 
a question on. I believe we can bring back a verdict. 
THE COURT: And would you rather do that now 
before· you disband? 
M_R. CHRISTENSEN: Well, we can do it right here 
now." 
Further questioning indicated that the jury was not guite 
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ready. They returned to the jury room at 10:31 p.m. and 
returned with a verdict of guilty with recommendation of 
mercy 11 minutes later (R. 392). A reading of the col1oquy 
indicates to us that the jury could not decide whether or not 
defendant should die. Having found that they could let the 
court decide, they recommended mercy. 
For the above reasons, we submit that the instruction 
complained of was proper and that, even if there was a tech-
nical error, there is no basis for assuming that the defendant 
was prejudiced thereby. The court is not justified in pre-
suming that error has resulted in prejudice. 105-43-1 Utah 
Code Annotated 1943. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW 
THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RE-
FUSING TO FOLLOW THE MERCY RECOM11ENDA-
TION OF THE JURY. 
It is now contended that the court abused its discretion 
in sentencing the defendant to death rather than to life im-
prisonment as recommended by the jury. 
It is settled in this state, and conceded by the defendant, 
that an abuse of discretion must be shown before there can 
be a reversal on the court's refusal to follow the recommenda-
tion of the jury. State v. Markham, 100 Utah 226, 112 P. 
2d 496. 
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The effect of recommendations of mercy vanes m the 
various states. In some states the court is obligated to follow 
the jury's recommendation. In others, a recommendation is 
not authorized by law and is considered as merely advisory. 
A few statutory provisions contemplate that the jury will base 
its recommendation upon some evidence of mitigation or justi-
fication which appears at the trial. It is because of this vari-
ance that the statutory provisions should be studied when an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the court is being asserted 
on the grounds we have here. 
Our provision is found in 103-28-4 Utah Code Annotated 
1943, quoted in appellant's brief (p. 33). \Ve note that the 
Utah statute has no conditions precedent to a recommendation 
of mercy. A jury may recommend mercy even if the defendant 
is convicted on overwhelming evidence and the crime is 
heinous. A recommendation may be made, so to speak, on 
the basis of the defendant's looks. And because such a recom-
mendation need not be grounded in reason, there is nothing 
on which we can conclude that the recommendation was made 
because of "the skimpy case presented by the state." Such 
a conclusion would be a guess. We must assume that the 
jury considered the evidence, under the instructions, before 
deciding whether defendant was guilty. 
Utah has adopted the view that the discretion of the jury 
m recommending life imprisonment is absolute and need 
not be based upon evidence or a showing at the trial. State 
v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208, 117 Pac. 58; State v. Romeo, 42 
Utah 46, 128 Pac. 530. 
26 
J 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In State v. Markham, cited supra, 100 Utah 226, 112 P. 
2d 496, there was some positive evidence presented by the 
defense which might have tended to mitigate the seriousness 
of the crime, yet the court refused to find an abuse of discretion 
in the court's refusal to follow a recommendation of mercy. 
In the present case there is nothing to indicate to the court 
that the killing of Mr. Delk was anything but a cold-blooded 
murder. There would not be an abuse of discretion here 
even under the reasoning of the concurring opinion of Justice 
Wolfe in the Markham case, which opinion sought to restrict, 
to some extent at least, the exercise of discretion by the court 
where it might appear that the recommendation of the jury 
was based upon evidence-that is, something which would 
tend to lessen the seriousness of the homicide. In the present 
case there is no pretense, no contention, that there were any 
mitigating circumstances. No provocation, sufficient or in-
sufficient, was shown. There was no evidence of anything 
bordering on justification or excuse. And our discussion of the 
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, under Point 1, has indicat-
ed that the depravity of the crime does not depend upon the type 
of evidence used by the state to prove that crime. Defendant was 
given an opportunity to appeal to the court's leniency, but 
stood silent and offered to show nothing by any means or 
persons. See, generally, on recommendations of mercy and 
their effect, annotations in 12 A.L.R. 1153, and 87 A.L.R. 13 70. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in the case was sufficient to justify the 
jury in determining that someone had cold-bloodedly, de-
liberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought, 
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killed Levi P. Delk; that the murder was committed by the 
defendant; and that the idea of theft of an automobile and 
other property motivated the defendant to plan the murder. 
All the evidence indicates that the murder was committed in 
Salt Lake County. The instructions to the jury were fair and 
fully protected the rights of the defendant. And, finally, 
the court acted well within the bounds of its discretion in 
sentencing the defendant to death. The authorities have con-
vinced us that substantial justice was done in the court ·below, 
and for that reason we believe that the judgment and sentence 
should be affirmed. But if the court does find some error 
which might have prejudiced the defendant, we respectfully 
urge the court, if possible, to exercise its powers under 105-43-3 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, and modify the judgment to 
the extent that justice may be done. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
BRYCE E. ROE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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